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ABSTRACT
We study the consequences of age-dependent preferences for economic growth
and structural change in a two-sector model with overlapping generations and non-
dimishing returns to capital. Savings and accumulation rates depend on the relative
price of services consumed by old agents and on the intergenerational distribution
of income. The feedback effects originating in preferences and income distribution
yield three possible long-run growth outcomes: sustained endogenous growth, decu-
mulation traps, and bounded accumulation. In the endogenous growth scenario, the
transition features rising savings and accumulation rates accompaniedbydistributional
shifts in favor of young workers, growing employment and rising prices in the service
sector. Traps are triggeredby initially lowcapital inmanufacturing and lowemployment
in services. Bounded accumulation yielding zero long-run growth in per capita incomes
is induced by preferences, not by diminishing returns to capital.
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1. Introduction
More than fifty years after Kuznets (1966) seminal work, understanding the interactions
between economic growth and structural change remains a central topic in macroeco-
nomics. Two major questions, in particular, still lack comprehensive answers. How are
savings and accumulation – two crucial engines of growth – related to the determinants
of structural change? And what triggers equilibrium paths where economic growth and
structural change feed or counteract each other?
These questions are furthermore relevant in view of the recent growth experience of
East Asian economies, in particular China, where the typical pattern of structural change
– manufacturing sectors spark development but service sectors eventually dominate in
later stages (Barude and Menashe 2011; Brakman, Inklaar, and Van Marrewijk 2013;
Craighead and Hineline 2015) – was accompanied by the ‘savings puzzle’ of very high
and increasing household saving rates (Chamon and Prasad 2010) and by substantial
shifts in the income distribution in favor of young workers (Song and Yang 2010). Most
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of the existing literature addressed these phenomena as separate topics without investi-
gating possible causal links between sectoral shifts, saving behavior and distributional
shifts.1 Mehlum, Torvik, and Valente (2016) provide a first comprehensive theory of
saving behavior and structural change by assuming age-dependent preferences: young
agents work and save in order to finance future purchases of old-age services (e.g. health
care); capital accumulation increases wages and the relative price of services, causing
structural change as well as saving effects that may be self-reinforcing or self-balancing
over time. The analysis of Mehlum, Torvik, and Valente (2016), however, abstracts from
productivity growth: there is no technological change in either sector, and the economy
exhibits a neoclassical steady state with constant per capita income. The economy con-
verges to such steady state under both complementarity and substitutability between
manufacturing goods and services. In this note, we endogeneize growth via technolog-
ical change in the manufacturing sector, obtaining novel results about the long-term
consequences of age-dependent preferences. Depending on the initial state and on the
elasticity of substitution, there are three possible long-run growth outcomes: sustained
endogenous growth, decumulation traps, and bounded accumulation. The scenario with
sustained endogenous growth in the long run exhibits empirically-consistent transi-
tional dynamics, i.e. rising accumulation rates accompanied by distributional shifts in
favor of young workers, growing employment and rising prices in the service sector.
Decumulation traps are triggered by initial capital scarcity in the manufacturing sec-
tor and are characterized by low employment in services. The scenario with bounded
accumulation features zero long-run growth in per capita incomes caused by strict sub-
stitutability between manufacturing goods and services, despite the fact that capital
exhibits non-diminishing returns in manufacturing production.
The general intuition for these results is that economic growth is both a cause and
a consequence of structural change because savings depend on the relative price of ser-
vices and on the intergenerational distribution of income. The two key mechanisms can
be disentangled as follows. First, capital accumulation increases wages earned by the
young and therefore the relative price of the labor-intensive services consumed by the
old. The increase in service prices, in turn, induces structural change, the direction of
which depends on the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing goods and ser-
vices. Second, the changes in the relative prices of capital and labor inputs affect the
intergenerational distribution of income and thereby savings. This mechanism origi-
nates in the overlapping-generations (OLG) demographic structure and is similar to,
but conceptually different from, that found in one-sector OLG models of endogenous
growth byBertola (1996) andUhlig andYanagawa (1996). These contributions show that
exogenous changes in the functional incomedistribution induced by capital income taxes
affect young cohorts’ savings (by modifying the shares of income captured by different
generations) and thereby economic growth, which is endogenously determined by cap-
ital accumulation. In our two-sector OLG model, instead, labor reallocations between
manufacturing and services acts as endogenous changes to the income distribution that
affect savings of young agents and thereby growth in the capital-intensivemanufacturing
sector.
2. Themodel
Households. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of selfish agents that
live for two periods (t, t+ 1). Total population Nt consists of Nyt young and Not old
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3
agents, and grows at the exogenous rate Nt+1/Nt = Nyt /Not = 1 + n. Preferences are
age-dependent since agents have different needs in different periods of life. Specifically,
each agent purchases manufactured goods in both periods of life and old age-related ser-
vices (e.g. health care, nursing) in the second period of life, in order tomaximize lifetime
utility
Ut ≡ u (ct) + βv (dt+1, ht+1) = ln ct + β ln
[
γ · d
σ−1
σ
t+1 + (1 − γ ) · h
σ−1
σ
t+1
] σ
σ−1
, (1)
where ct and dt+1 are consumed quantities ofmanufactured goods, ht+1 is the purchased
quantity of services, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, γ ∈ (0, 1) is a taste parameter, and
σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution: goods and services are complements if σ < 1, sub-
stitutes if σ > 1. The hypothesis of age-dependent needs in (1) assumes the absence
of a comprehensive welfare system, which obliges retired agents to purchase ht+1 on
the market. These hypotheses capture important aspects of the actual structure of the
intertemporal trade-offs faced by private agents in many fast developing countries – e.g.
China, where the impact of rising private expenditures on old-age care and health is a
well documented fact (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2006). Concerning the elasticity of sub-
stitution, empirical evidence tends to support the case of strict complementarity, σ > 1
(Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo 2013). Taking the manufactured good as the
numeraire, the budget constraints read
ct = wt − st , dt+1 + pt+1ht+1 = stRt+1, (2)
where wt is the wage rate earned by young agents, each of which supplies inelastically
one unit of labor, st is savings, and pt+1 is the price of services. Savings consist of goods
stored in period t and used as capital in producing goods in period t+ 1 (with full capital
depletion after use) so that the gross interestRt+1 represents the capital rental rate. Labor
is perfectly mobile between sectors: we will denote by t the fraction of the work force
Nyt employed in manufacturing, and by (1 − t) the employment share of the service
sector.
Manufacturing sector. Goods are produced by a continuum of firms, indexed by j ∈
[0, J], exploiting the technology
Xjt ≡ (kjt)α(atjtNyt )1−α for each j ∈ [0, J] , (3)
where kjt and 
j
tN
y
t are capital and labor units employed by the jth firm to produceX
j
t units
of output, α ∈ (0, 1) is a constant, and at is labor productivity in the manufacturing sec-
tor. Firms maximize profits taking at and all prices as given. The standard neoclassical
model can be obtained by setting at equal to a constant, which would imply diminishing
returns to aggregate capital. The present analysis, instead, considers non-diminishing
returns generated by learning-by-doing externalities (Romer 1986): labor productiv-
ity in manufacturing increases with the average amount of capital used by each worker
according to the spillover function at = A
1
1−α · Kt/(tNyt ), where Kt = Jkjt is aggregate
capital andA> 0 is a constant. Aggregating (3) across firms and substituting the spillover
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function, sectoral output Xt = JXjt becomes linear in aggregate capital,
Xt = AKt . (4)
Service sector. Our analysis builds on the premise that the service sector is labor-
intensive, and to model this in the simplest possible way we assume that services are
produced by labor alone under constant returns to scale,
Ht ≡ η · (1 − t) · Nyt , (5)
where Ht is total supply of services, and η > 0 is a productivity parameter. The zero-
profit condition
wt = ptη (6)
implies that the price of services will always be proportional to the market wage rate.
3. Intratemporal equilibrium
Denote capital per worker by κt ≡ Kt/Nyt and consider the intratemporal equilibrium
arising in period t for a given κt . Such an equilibrium is fully characterized by two
intratemporal loci, denoted by	 and
 , representing the labor-market equilibrium and
the product-market equilibrium, respectively. Combining (6) with the labor demand of
manufacturing firms, we obtain the equilibrium condition for the labor market
pt = (A/η) (1 − α) (κt/t) ≡ 	(t , κt) , (7)
where 	(t , κt) is the price of services that, for each value of the employment share t ,
guarantees equal wages between the two sectors for a given κt . Next, combining house-
holds’ demands for goods and services with the relative supplies of goods and services,
we obtain the equilibrium condition for the product markets
pt =
(
1 − γ
γ
) σ
σ−1 [ (1 − α) (1 − t)
t − (1 − α)
] 1
1−σ
≡ 
 (t) , (8)
where
(t) is the price of services that, for each value of the employment share t , clears
both product markets. In (8), the restriction t > 1 − α always holds in equilibrium
since it is a necessary condition for positive second-period consumption. The economic
intuition for this restriction is the following. Diminishing marginal returns to labor in
manufacturing imply that a very low employment share t makes the equilibrium wage
rate very high compared to the returns fromcapital, which in turnmakes old-age services
very expensive relative to second-period incomes. The second-period budget constraint
in (2) shows that goods consumption of the old dt+1 is positive if and only if expendi-
tures on services do not exceed income from previous savings, stRt+1 − pt+1ht+1 > 0.
If the employment share in manufacturing falls below 1 − α, the equilibrium wage rate
and the associated price of labor-intensive services become so high that the burden of
desired service expenditures would exceed second-period incomes, stRt+1 < pt+1ht+1,
leaving no resources available for goods consumption in the second period of life (see
the Appendix for a formal proof of this result). An interior equilibrium with positive
goods’ consumption thus requires satisfying the restriction t > 1 − α.
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Figure 1. Upper panel: determination of the intratemporal equilibrium under (a) complementarity and (b) substi-
tutability. Lower panel: equilibrium dynamics under (c) complementarity and (d) substitutability.
The intra-temporal equilibrium is fully characterized by expressions (7) and (8). The
properties of	 and
 are graphically described in Figure 1(a,b). The labor-market locus
	 is strictly decreasing in t because higher employment in manufacturing reduces the
private marginal product of labor in that sector, putting downward pressure on the wage
rate and on the price of services. The slope of the product-market locus depends on
the elasticity of substitution between goods and services.When σ < 1, complementarity
implies a strictly decreasing
(t) because a higher pt induce old agents to increase their
expenditure share for services, which attracts labor in services and reduces t . When
σ > 1, substitutability implies a strictly decreasing 
(t) because agents respond to a
higher pt by reducing their expenditure share for services, which attracts labor in the
manufacturing sector and raises t .2 In either case, the properties of	 and
 guarantee
existence and uniqueness of the intratemporal equilibrium (see Appendix).
The equilibrium is characterized by an employment share of themanufacturing sector
t = (κt) given by the fixed point
 (κt) ≡ arg solve{t∈(1−α,1)} [	(t , κt) = 
 (t)] . (9)
As the sectoral division of labor determines the labor share of income, a key mech-
anism of the model is the response of employment shares to changes in capital per
worker. From (7), the labor-market locus exhibits ∂	/∂κt > 0 because higher capital
per worker increases the marginal product of labor, the wage rate, and the price of ser-
vices. Graphically, an increase in κt shifts	 upwards in Figure 1(a,b). This comparative
statics exercise shows that changes in capital per worker push employment in different
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directions depending on the elasticity of substitution between goods and services:
′κt ≡
d (κt)
dκt
{
< 0 if σ < 1
> 0 if σ > 1
. (10)
Therefore, preferences determine the direction of the structural change generated by
capital accumulation: higher capital always implies higher price of services but employ-
ment will move towards services, increasing the labor share of income, under comple-
mentarity, and towards manufacturing, lowering the labor share, under substitutability.
4. Equilibrium dynamics
The aggregate constraintKt+1 = Nyt st and the utility-maximizing conditions for savings
yield the dynamic law
κt+1 (1 + n) = (1 − α)Aκt · β1 + β ·
1
t
(11)
where the left hand side is next-period capital per worker adjusted for population
growth. The right hand side of (11) shows immediately the role of the income distri-
bution: (1 − α)Aκt is the share of manufacturing production accruing to each young
worker, and β/(1 + β) is the fraction of income that is saved. The last term in (11) cap-
tures the fact that the economy’s aggregate wage earnings are larger, by a factor 1/t , than
the total wage earnings of workers employed in manufacturing. The fact that 1/t > 1
introduces a multiplier effect which evolves endogenously over time and makes struc-
tural change, income distribution and capital accumulation intimately linked to each
other.
In the literature on income distribution and endogenous growth, Bertola (1996) and
Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) show that taxing the old and distributing the proceeds to
wage earners may stimulate growth in one-sector OLG models. This result is based on
accumulation laws that are similar to (11) but where the ‘multiplier’ factor is replaced by
a ‘policy’ factor determined by exogenous fiscal instruments, which is larger than one
when the redistributive policy raises the income share of young workers. In our two-
sector model, a similar redistribution effect is endogenously determined by the demand
of old agents for labor-intensive services, which modifies the income share captured by
young workers; the strength of this effect, measured by 1/t , is generally time-varying
because the allocation of labor is subject to structural change as the economy develops.
By substituting the equilibrium level t = (κt) defined by (9) into equation (11), we
obtain the autonomous equation
κt+1
κt
= 1
1 + n (1 − α)A
β
1 + β
1
 (κt)
, (12)
which fully describes the accumulation path and includes the feedback effects that κt
exerts on the labor share. The sign of such feedback effects is determined by the value of
σ that determines the sign of ′κt : from (12) and (10), complementarity (substitutability)
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between goods and services accelerates (curbs) accumulation over time;
d (κt+1/κt)
dκt
= − 1
1 + n (1 − α)A
β
1 + β ·
′κt
 (κt)
2
{
> 0 if σ < 1
< 0 if σ > 1
. (13)
Result (13) establishes that capital accumulation does not proceed at a constant rate over
time (unless in the special case σ = 1). Specifically, the accumulation process is self-
reinforcing when σ < 1 and self-balancing when σ > 1. This dichotomy implies several
possible scenarios of growth and structural change. Since σ < 1 can be argued to be
the empirically most plausible case (Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo 2013), our
discussion begins with the case of complementarity.
4.1. Complementarity, sustained growth and traps
The accumulation law (12) admits the existence of an interior steady state (κ¯ , (κ¯)) in
which capital per worker equals κt+1 = κt = κ¯ and the employment share of manufac-
turing t = (κt) equals
 (κ¯) = Aβ (1 − α)
(1 + β) (1 + n) . (14)
Since 1 − α < t < 1 must hold in equilibrium, the interior steady state (κ¯ , (κ¯)) exists
only if
1 − α < Aβ (1 − α)
(1 + β) (1 + n) < 1. (15)
Suppose that (15) holds and assume σ < 1. From (13), complementarity implies that
the steady state κ¯ is globally unstable. Consequently, depending on initial endow-
ments, two scenariosmay arise: the economymay undertake a permanent accumulation
path, or remain trapped in a permanent decumulation path, as established in the next
Proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (Complementarity): Assume σ < 1. If (15) holds, the interior steady
state (κ¯ , (κ¯)) is dynamically unstable and thus acts as a separating threshold determin-
ing two possible scenarios. First, if κ0 > κ¯ , net accumulation per worker is positive and
self-reinforcing: employment in services and the saving rate increase during the transition,
capital per worker and the price of health care grow forever yielding sustained endogenous
growth in the long run with
lim
t→∞
κt+1
κt
= Aβ
(1 + β) (1 + n) > 1 and limt→∞  (κt) = 1 − α. (16)
Second, if κ0 < κ¯ , net accumulation per worker is persistently negative,with opposite tran-
sitional dynamics: in the long run, employment in services and capital per worker vanish
asymptotically,
lim
t→∞ κt = 0 and limt→∞  (κt) = 1. (17)
Proof: See Appendix. 
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The reason for these results is that, under complementarity, capital accumulation
induces positive feedback effects on savings via structural change and distributional
shifts. The case with sustained endogenous growth in the long run – henceforth called
‘Scenario 1’ – is due to the fact that growing capital per worker drives up the health-
care price and reduces the employment share of themanufacturing sector, increasing the
income share of young workers and thereby savings, boosting subsequent capital accu-
mulation. This equilibrium path is graphically described in Figure 1, diagram (c). Given
κ0 > κ¯ , the employment share ofmanufacturing is below the critical level, (κ0) < (κ¯),
and positive net accumulation of capital per worker in the manufacturing sector drives
manufacturing employment further down, feeding sustained growth in the long run.
Symmetrically, the case with permanent decumulation – henceforth called ‘Scenario
2’ – results from an initial decline in capital per worker that causes self-reinforcing feed-
back effects. When κ0 < κ¯ , the employment share of manufacturing is above the critical
level, (κ0) > (κ¯), and net accumulation per worker is strictly negative. The manufac-
turing sector experiences falling capital per worker while the service sector progressively
disappears: wages and the relative price of services decline over time, and labor fully
migrates to manufacturing in the long run.3
The results obtained under complementarity deserve two remarks. First, Scenario 1
predicts increasing accumulation rates in conjunction with the typical path of structural
change observed in developing economies, e.g.the East Asian miracles: rising wages and
service prices, growing employment in services, distributional shifts in favor of young
workers, and increasing savings accumulation rates during the transition. Second, as
shown in Figure 1, diagram (c), escaping the decumulation trap of Scenario 2 requires
having a sufficiently large stock of aggregate capital at time zero so that manufacturing
firms have sufficiently high capital per worker, the resulting equilibrium wage is suffi-
ciently high, and the service sector displays a sufficiently high price and a sufficiently high
employment share – that is, achieving sustained growth in manufacturing is associated
with having a large service sector at time zero.
4.2. Substitutability and bounded accumulation
When σ > 1, the interior steady state (κ¯ , (κ¯)) is globally stable due to self-balancing
accumulation: from (13), labor reallocations reduce κt+1/κt over time until capital per
worker and themanufacturing employment share reach the stationary levels κ¯ and (κ¯).
Proposition 4.2 (Substitutability): Assume σ > 1. If (15) holds, the interior steady state
(κ¯ , (κ¯)) is globally stable: if κ0 < κˆ(κ0 > κˆ), the economy follows a self-balancing accu-
mulation (decumulation) path during the transition, and converges from below (above) to
the stationary long-run equilibrium featuring
lim
t→∞ κt = κ¯ and limt→∞  (κt) =  (κ¯) . (18)
Proof: See Appendix. 
Themain result established in Proposition 4.2 may be restated as follows: whenman-
ufacturing and services are substitutes, the existence of a steady-state level of capital per
worker compatible with positive production in both sectors implies that the AK model
behaves similarly to a neoclassical model. Starting from relatively low capital, capital per
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worker grows over time but at decreasing rates, until the economy reaches a stable steady
state representing the long-run equilibrium.However, this result is not due to decreasing
returns to capital in production: differently from the neoclassical model, the conver-
gence towards (κ¯ , (κ¯)) is determined by the reaction of sectoral employment shares to
capital accumulation. Since capital growth increases employment in the generic sector,
accumulation under substitutability is self-balancing. This conclusion is opposite to that
obtained under complementarity, where accumulation is self-reinforcing. Figure 1, dia-
gram (d), shows that the economy may approach the steady state from below or from
above. If κ0 < κ¯ , both capital per worker and manufacturing employment grow over
time along the trajectory termed Scenario 3′. If κ0 > κ¯ , instead, capital per worker and
manufacturing employment decline along the trajectory termed Scenario 3′′.4
The long-run predictions for the case of substitutability, summarized in expres-
sion (18), may resemble but do not match those of neoclassical models: accumulation
is eventually bounded by preference-induced structural change, not by diminishing
returns to capital. Scenario 3 thus signals that demand-side forces may impede sus-
tained endogenous growth in the long run despite constant returns to capital in the
manufacturing sector.5 This conclusion has links with recent findings of the literature on
endogenous growth and resource scarcity, which shows that different degrees of substi-
tutability between natural and man-made inputs alters the stability properties of steady
states (Peretto 2012) and that poor substitutability may promote sectoral change and
enhance investment activities (Bretschger and Smulders 2012).
5. Conclusion
Age-dependent preferences can play a critical role in shaping the interactions between
economic growth and structural change because they create explicit causal links between
changes in sectoral employment levels and accumulation rates. On the one hand, age-
dependent needs create feedbacks from capital accumulation – which increases wages
and thereby the relative price of labor-intensive services consumed by the old – to struc-
tural change. On the other hand, the same changes in the relative prices of capital and
labor inputs modify savings via changes in the intergenerational distribution of income,
and savings in turn affect economic growth by changing the speed of accumulation.
Our model shows that the feedback effects originating in age-dependent preferences
determine growth prospects, with three possible outcomes in the long run, as well as
the qualitative dynamics of sectoral employment and relative prices. In particular, the
scenario with sustained endogenous growth in the long run exhibits the typical path
of structural change observed in developing countries coupled with the phenomenon
of rising accumulation rates during the transition. More generally, our results suggest
that preferences and the demographic structure are key ingredients to build a theory of
circular causality in which economic growth is both a cause and a consequence of struc-
tural change. Investigating the role played by age-dependent needs and intergenerational
income shares in driving the process of economic development is our main suggestion
for future research.
Notes
1. On the one hand, theories of structural transformation suggest that the observed patterns of struc-
tural change reflect basic forces operating in the product markets – i.e. sectoral differences in
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productivity growth interacting with preferences for differentiated goods – but these explanations
typically abstract from saving dynamics and income distribution (see Acemoglu 2009, Ch.20). On
the other hand, the saving puzzle has been rationalized by theories of relative consumption (Car-
roll, Overland, andWeil 2000; Alvarez-Cuadrado, Monteiro, and Turnovsky 2004) that, abstracting
from structural change, predict circular causality between growth and saving rates over time.
2. The special case σ = 1 implies that 
 reduces to a vertical locus whereby t is independent of pt ;
the resulting intertemporal equilibrium is characterized by constant employment shares that do not
depend on service price and capital per worker.
3. When (15) is violated, no interior steady state exists and two subcases may arise. When 1 − α <
1 < Aβ(1−α)
(1+β)(1+n) , the economy exhibits endogenous growth as in Scenario 1 for any κ0 > 0. When
Aβ(1−α)
(1+β)(1+n) < 1 − α < 1, the economy is trapped in permanent decumulation as in Scenario 2 for
any κ0 > 0.
4. When (15) is violated, no interior steady state exists and two subcasesmay arise.When 1 − α < 1 <
Aβ(1−α)
(1+β)(1+n) , the equilibrium path is similar to Scenario 3
′ but the service sector disappears because
the manufacturing employment share approaches limt→∞ (κt) = 1.When Aβ(1−α)(1+β)(1+n) < 1 − α <
1, the equilibriumpath is similar to Scenario 3′′ but themanufacturing employment share eventually
reaches the lower bound limt→∞ (κt) = 1 − α.
5. The manufacturing sector in our model satisfies the standard conditions that, in the absence of the
service sector, would guarantee persistent endogenous growth in one-sector OLG economies: see
Tvede (2010, Ch.8).
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Appendix
Derivation of (7). Aggregating the profit-maximizing conditions ∂Xjt/∂
j
t = wtNyt and ∂Xjt/∂kjt = Rt
across firms and substituting at = A
1
1−α (κt/t) gives
wt = a1−αt (1 − α) (κt/t)α = A (1 − α) (κt/t) , (A1)
Rt = a1−αt α (t/κt)1−α = αA. (A2)
Combining (6) with (A1) gives (7).
Derivation of (8). Maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields
st = β1 + β wt , (A3)
pt+1 =
(
1 − γ
γ
) σ
σ−1
·
(
pt+1ht+1
dt+1
) 1
1−σ
. (A4)
From Ht = Not ht and (5) and (6),
pt+1ht+1 = wt+1 (1 − t+1) (1 + n) . (A5)
From (2), (A5) and Kt+1 = Nyt st ,
dt+1 = stRt+1 − pt+1ht+1 = (1 + n) · [κt+1Rt+1 − wt+1 (1 − t+1)] . (A6)
Substituting (A1) and (A2) in (A6) gives
dt+1 = (1 + n)A · (κt+1/t+1) · [t+1 − (1 − α)] , (A7)
which implies that dt+1 > 0 requires t+1 > 1 − α. As explained in the main text, the economic intu-
ition for this inequality restriction is that too low employment in manufacturing would make wages,
service prices and the overall burden of desired service expenditures too high (relative to second-
period incomes) for old agents to have sufficient resources for purchasing manufactured goods as well.
Inserting (A7) and (A5) into (A4), and using (A1)-(A2), yields (8) at time t+ 1.
Existence and uniqueness of the fixed point (9). From (7) and (8), the loci 	 and 
 exhibit
lim
t→1−α
	 = (A/η)κt and lim
t→1
	 = (A/η)(1 − α)κt ,
lim
t→1−α

 = ∞ and lim
t→1

 = 0 if σ < 1,
lim
t→1−α

 = 0 and lim
t→1

 = ∞ if σ > 1.
When σ > 1, existence and uniqueness of (9) follow from combining the above limits with ∂	/∂t < 0
and ∂
/∂t > 0. When σ < 1, we have ∂	/∂t < 0 and ∂
/∂t < 0, and the above limits combined
with the elasticities
∂	/∂t
	/t
= −1 and ∂
/∂t

/t
= − 1
1 − σ ·
α
1 − t ·
t
t − (1 − α) > 1
guarantee existence of a unique intersection 	 = 
 where 
 cuts 	 from above (cf. Figure 1(a)).
Derivation of (11). Substituting (A3) in Kt+1 = Nyt st , and using (A1 ), yields (11).
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Proof of Proposition 4.1: Assuming that (15) holds, equation (12) implies that there exists an interior
steady state (κ¯ , (κ¯)) characterized by κt = κ¯ and (κt) = (κ¯) satisfying (14) and the feasibility condi-
tion 1 − α < (κ¯) < 1. From (13), complementarity implies that d(κt+1/κt)dκt > 0, so that the steady state
κt = κ¯ is dynamically unstable. First, consider the case κ0 > κ¯ . From (10), having κ0 > κ¯ under com-
plementarity implies an employment share of manufacturing strictly below the critical level associated
with the steady state, (κ0) < (κ¯). This implies
 (κ0) <  (κ¯) ,
1
 (κ0)
>
1
 (κ¯)
,
Aβ (1 − α)
(1 + β) (1 + n) ·
1
 (κ0)
>
Aβ (1 − α)
(1 + β) (1 + n) ·
1
 (κ¯)
. (A8)
In (A8), the left hand side equals κ1/κ0 by (12) and the right hand side equals 1 by definition (14).
Therefore, starting from κ0 > κ¯ , we have
κ1
κ0
= Aβ (1 − α)
(1 + β) (1 + n) ·
1
 (κ0)
> 1
which means that accumulation drives κt farther away from the steady state κ¯ between period 0 and
period 1. Since κ1 > κ0 drives the employment share of manufacturing further down in the subsequent
period, (κ1) < (κ0), we obtain again positive growth in κt in all subsequent periods t  2. In the limit
as t → ∞, equation (12) and the definition of equilibrium employment share in (9) imply, respectively,
the two asymptotic results reported in expression (16).
Considering the opposite case κ0 < κ¯ , all the above mechanisms operate in reverse – that is, we
observe (κ0) > (κ¯) and therefore decumulation, κ1 < κ0, with a growing employment share (κ1) >
(κ0) in the first as well as in all subsequent periods, which drives κt to zero as time goes to infinity –
and imply the asymptotic results reported in expression (17). 
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Assuming that (15) holds, equation (12) implies that there exists an inte-
rior steady state (κ¯ , (κ¯)) characterized by κt = κ¯ and (κt) = (κ¯) satisfying (14) and the feasibility
condition 1 − α < (κ¯) < 1. From (13), substitutability implies that d(κt+1/κt)dκt < 0, so that the steady
state κt = κ¯ is dynamically stable. Therefore, the asymptotic results reported in expression (18) hold
for any κ0  κ¯ . If κ0 < κ¯ , capital per worker grows over time but at vanishing rates in view of (12)
and (13), and the same qualitative path is follows by the employment share of manufacturing in view
of (10) under substitutability. For the same reasons, if κ0 > κ¯ , both capital per worker and the employ-
ment share of manufacturing decline over time but at vanishing rates, until κt = κ¯ eventually holds
asymptotically. 
Note on non-interior steady states. The scenarios arising when (15) is violated can be verified by
Figure 1(c,d). If 1 − α < 1 < Aβ(1−α)
(1+β)(1+n) , the critical share (κ¯) is pushed above the unity upper-bound;
if Aβ(1−α)
(1+β)(1+n) < 1 − α < 1, the critical share (κ¯) is pushed below the lower-bound (1 − α).
